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I. Introduction
Violence risk assessment is a critical and expanding part of the practice
of mental health law in the United States. "Dangerousness to others" first
became one of the pivotal criteria for involuntary hospitalization of people
with mental disorders in the 1960s.1 Courts first imposed tort liability on
* Henry and Grace Doherty Professor of Law and Horace Goldsmith Research Profes-
sor, University of Virginia School of Law.
1. See PAUL S.ApELAUM,AimoST A REVOLUTION: MHNTALHEALTHLAWAND THE
LIM OF CHANGE 26 (1994) (creditingjurisdictions in which commitment depended on dang-
erousness to others).
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clinicians who negligently failed to predict their patients' violence in the
1970s.2 In the 1980s, many states enacted statutes authorizing involuntary
treatment in the community for otherwise "dangerous" patients.3 During the
1990s, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)4 explicitly mandated risk
assessments of violence.'
n Part Il of this Article, I review existing research on the validity of
clinical risk assessments of violent behavior. In Part Il, I consider whether,
in light of this research, clinical risk assessments of violence are admissible
as scientific evidence.
. Violence RiskAssessment: The State of the Science6
Since the publication by Paul Meehl of Clinical Versus StatisticalPredic-
tion in 1954,' it generally is accepted that there are two fundamental ap-
proaches to risk assessment. In Meehl's most recent account, he contrasted
two ways offorecastingbehavior. One, aformal method, uses an equation,
a formula, a graph, or an actuarial table to arrive at a probability, or ex-
pectedvalue, of some outcome; the other method relies on an informal, "in
the head," impressionistic, subjective conclusion, reached... by a human
clinical judge.8
2. See Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334,340 (1976) (impos-
ing duty of reasonable care upon therapist to protect intended victim); see also John Monahan,
Limiting Therapist Exposure to TarasoffLiability: Guidelines for Risk Containment, 48 AU&
PSYCHOLOGIST 242 (1993) (discussing duty to protect).
3. See Marvin S. Swartz et al., New Directions in Research on Involuntary Outpatient
Commitment, 46 PSYCHIATRIC SERvICEs 381, 381 (1995) (evaluating involuntary outpatient
commitment programs).
4. Pub. L. No. 101-336,104 Stat 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29,
42 and 47 U.S.C.).
5. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336,104 Stat 327 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 29, 42, and 47 U.S.C.). The ADA protects the employment
rights of people with disabilities, unless those disabilities result in an employee becoming a
"direct threat" of violence to co-workers or customers. See Christopher G. Bell, The Americans
with DisabiliiesAct, Mental Disabilit, and Work, in MENTAL DISORDE, WORKDISABITY,
AND THE LAW 203, 210 (Richard J. Bonnie & John Monahan eds., 1997) (discussing "direct
threat to health and safety" standard).
6. Sections of Part H are adapted, with permission, from 1 DAvID L. FAIGMAN ET AL,
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 287, 287-318
(1997 & Supp. 2000).
7. PAULE. MEEHL, CINICAL VRSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION (1954).
8. William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency oflnformal (Subjective,
Impressionistic) andFormal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical-
Statistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. PoL'Y, & L. 293,294 (1996).
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The latter is called the clinical approach and the former the actuarial ap-
proach. I will consider each in turn.
A. Clinical Approaches to Risk Assessment
I reviewed research on the accuracy of clinical judgments at predicting
the criterion of "violent behavior toward others" in 198 L' The research con-
cluded that "psychiatrists and psychologists are accurate in no more than one
out of three predictions of violent behavior over a several-year period among
institutionalized populations that had both committed violence in the past (and
thus had high base rates for it) and who were diagnosed as mentally ill.
'' °
Remarkably, only one study of the validity of clinicians at predicting "vio-
lence in the community" was published between 1979 and 1993." This was
a study of court-ordered pretrial mental health assessments conducted in
1978.2 Consistent with the previous literature, 39% of the defendants rated
by clinicians as having a "high" likelihood for being violent to others were
reported to have committed dangerous acts during a two-year follow-up,
compared to 26% of defendants considered as having a "low" likelihood, a
statistically significant difference.'
3
In the last decade, researchers have shown a renewed interest in the topic
of clinical risk assessment. 4 For example, Lidz, Mulvey, and Gardner, in what
9. JOHNMONAtAN, TE CLuNICALPRIEICTIONOF VIOIENBEAVIOp (1981).
10. Id. at 47-49. In THE CUNICAL PREICTION Oiz VIoLENT BEa VloR, I reviewed five
studies: HENRY J. STEADMN & JoSEPHmI. CocozzA, CAREERS OF THE CRmh4ALLY INSANE:
ExcEssivE SmuAL CONTROL OF DEVIANCE (1974); TkRNmcE P. THORNBERRY & JosEPH E.
JACOBY, THE CRIMINALLYINSANE: ACOMUN FOLLOW-UP OF MENTAIYIL  OFFE ERS
(1979); Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry J. Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatic Predictions of
Dangerousness: Clear and ConvincingEvWdence, 29 RUTGEM L. REV. 1084 (1976); Harry L.
Kozol et al., The Diagnosis and Treatment ofDangerousness, 18 CRIME &DELTNQ. 371 (1972);
Henry 3. Steadman, A New Look atRecid'vismAmongPatuxent Inmates, 5 BuLi AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 200 (1977). Id. at45-50.
11. Diana Sepeak t al., Clinical Predictions of Dangerousness: Two-Year Follow-up
of408 PrerialForensic Cases, 11 BULL. AM ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 171 (1983).
12. Id. at 172.
13. Id. at 181 n.12.
14. Existing risk assessment research is done in one of two settings. One type of study
attempts to identify factors that predict violence in the hospital, but the other attempts to identify
factors that predict violence in the community. One obvious difficulty with trying to predict
violence in the hospital is that the structured milieu of the institution and the therapeutic (or at
least sedative) effects of medication seriously suppress the base rate of violence. The National
Institute of Mental Health's National Plan of Research to Improve Services endorsed research
on inpatient violence, but with an important annotation:
It is much easier and cheaper to do research on inpatient violence than on violence
by mental patients in the community. It should, however, be undertaken with
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is surely the most sophisticated study published on the clinical prediction of
violence," took as their subjects male and female patients being examined in
the acute psychiatric emergency room of a large civil hospital. 5 Psychiatrists
and nurses were asked to assess potential patient violence toward others over
the next six-month period. 6 Violence was measured by official records, by
patient self-report, and by the report of a collateral informant in the commu-
nity (e.g., a family member). 7 Patients who elicited professional concern
regarding future violence were found to be significantly more likely to be vio-
lent after release (53%) than were patients who had not elicited such concern
(36%).18
The accuracy of clinical prediction did not vary as a function of the pa-
tient's age or race.' 9 However, patient gender may have affected accuracy of
judgment.2" The accuracy of clinicians' predictions of male violence substan-
certain goals in mind. Its highest priority should be on discerning types of interac-
tion that are likely to be present in patient violence in the community as well.
NAIONALINSTTUTE OF M NTAL HEALTi, CARINGFOR PEOPIE Wrr SEVEE MENTAL DIS OR-
DERS: A NATIONAL PLAN OF REsERCH TO IPRovE SERvICES 44 (1991).
Validating risk assessments in the community presents different issues than validating risk
assessments in the hospital. In order to obtain a sufficient level of violence during the follow-
up, researchers often limit themselves to enrolling only subjects assumed to have a high base-
rate of violence (e.g., males with a prior history of violence). While assuring a base-rate of
follow-up violence sufficient to permit statistical validation of the predictor variables is indeed
a necessity, restricting the sample to only one gender obviously eliminates any chance of
uncovering associations between risk factors and violence in the other. Such a restriction also
eliminates the possibility of discovering interactions between gender and the risk factors being
studied. Given that several recent studies have reported that, among acutely disordered
populations, the level of violence committed by women is as high as that committed by men,
the restriction of actuarial risk research to male samples seems ill advised. And given that the
predictors of violence among persons who have already committed a violent act - that is, the
predictors of repeat violence - may be different than the predictors of initial violence, making
prior violence a criterion for inclusion in actuarial risk assessment research may yield findings
inapplicable to persons who have not yet been violent See Edward P. Mulvey et al.,Refraaming
the Research Question ofMentalPatientCrninality, 9 INT'LJ.L. &PSYCHOL 57,58-60 (1986)
(reviewing problems with past studies). The use of large sample sizes would allow fewer con-
straints to be placed on subject recruitment while providing a sufficient amount of follow-up
violence to permit the statistical validation of risk factors. By obtaining basic descriptive data
on subjects not selected for the research, one could extrapolate results from the study sample
back to the entire population from which the sample was drawn.
15. See Charles W. Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others, 269
JAMA 1007, 1007 (1993) (describing group).
16. See id. at 1008 (detailing method of study).
17. See id. (indicating how patient was judged to be involved in violent incident).
18. Id. at 1009.
19. Id. at 1009-10.
20. Id. at 1010.
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tially exceeded chance levels, both for patients with and without a prior
history of violent behavior." In contrast, the accuracy of clinicians' predic-
tions of female violence did not differ from chance.' Although the actual rate
of violent incidents among released female patients (49%) was higher than the
rate among released male patients (42%), the clinicians had predicted that
only 22% ofthe women would be violent, compared with predicting that 45%
of the men would commit a violent act.' The inaccuracy of clinicians at
predicting violence among women appeared to be a fimction of the clinicians'
serious underestimation of the base-rate of violence among mentally disor-
dered women. The underestimation was due, perhaps, to an inappropriate
extrapolation from the great gender differences in rates of violence among
people without mental disorders. 4
McNiel and Binder illustrated research predicting inpatient violence
(rather than violence in the community). They studied clinical predictions that
patients would be violent during the first week of hospitalization.' Of the
patients whom nurses had estimated had a 0% to 33% probability of being
violent on the ward, 10% were later rated by the nurses as having committed
a violent act; of the patients whom nurses had estimated had a 34% to 66%
chance of being violent; 24% were later rated as having committed a violent
act; and ofthe patients whom nurses had estimated had a 67% to 100% chance
of being violent, 40% were later rated as having acted violently.26
B. Actuarial Approaches to RiskAssessment
In the past several years, the field of "violence risk assessment'has seen
a dramatic shift away from studies attempting to validate the accuracy of clin-




24. Close to 90% of all persons arrested for violent crime in the United States are men,
and "there is no place in the world where men make up less than 80 percent of the people
arrested for violence, now or at any time in history." John Monahan, Causes of Violence, in
DRUGS AND VlOI.ElCE ]AMEmcA 79 (U.S. Sentencing Commission ed., 1995); see also Dale
E. McNiel & Rene L. Binder, Correlates ofAccuracy in the Assessment ofPsychiatric Inpa-
tients'Risk of Violence, 152 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 901, 901 (1995) ("Clinical judgments empha-
sizing gender and race/ethnicity were associated with predictive errors: nonwhite and male
patients tended to be false positives.").
25. Dale E. McNiel & Ren6e L. Binder, Clinical Assessment of the Risk of Violence
AmongPsychiatic Inpatients, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY. 1317,1317 (1991).
26. Id. at 1320 tbL1.
27. See Helena Chmum Kraemer et al., Coming to Terms With the Terms of Risk, 54
ARcHIV OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 337 (1997) (discussing terminology). To say that a variable
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that are actuarially (meaning statistically) associated with violence." Borum
has noted that a wide range of procedures can be subsumed under the rubric
of "actuarial" prediction:
At a minimum, these devices can serve as a checklist for clinicians to
ensure that essential areas of inquiry are recalled and evaluated. At best,
they may be able to provide hard actuarial data on the probability ofvio-
lence among people (and environments) with a given set of characteristics,
circumstances, or both."
There is a long tradition in criminology of using actuarial techniques in
predicting recidivism by released prisoners. For example, actuarial predic-
tions are used by statutes to determine parole eligibility in a number of
states °3 Actuarial techniques, however, only recently have been applied to
predicting violence among people with mental disorders.
The best example of the use of actuarial data to predict violence on a
hospital ward is a study by McNiel and Binder.3' They constructed an actuar-
ial scale consisting of five variables, each scored "yes" or "no;" each "yes"
answer earned one point.32 Patients who scored three or above on this five-
point actuarial scale were called "high risk," and patients who scored two or
is a "risk factor" for violence means only two things: (1) the variable correlates with the out-
come (in this case, violence), and (2) the variable precedes the outcome. To call a variable a
"risk factor" does not imply that its relationship to the outcome is in any sense "causal."
28. Clinical and actuarial approaches are considered in depth in VERNON L. QUINSEYET
AL., VoLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISNG AND MANAGNGRISK 55-72,141-90 (1998).
29. Randy Borum, Improving the Clinical Practice of Violence RiskAssessment:. Tech-
nology, Guidelines; and Training, 51 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 945,948 (1996); see Grove & Meehl,
supra note 8, at 299-318 (stating strong argument for superiority of actuarial over clinical
prediction by answering common criticisms of actuarial prediction).
30. See JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WAUCER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND
MAjmurALs (4th ed. 1998) (reviewing parole prediction devices).
31. Dale E. McNiel & Ren e L. Binder, Screening for Risk of Inpatient Violence:
Validation of an Actuarial Tool, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 579 (1994). See generally Dale E.
McNiel et al., The Relationship Between Confidence and Accuracy in Clinical Assessment of
Psychiahic Patients'Potenialfor Violence, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 655 (1998) [hereinafter
McNiel et al., The Relationship Between Confidence and Accuracy]; Dale E. McNiel et al.,
Predictors of Violence in Civilly CommittedAcute Psychiatric Patients, 145 AM. J. PSYCHOL
965 (1988).
32. The variables were:
(1) History of physical attacks and/or fear-inducing behavior within two weeks before
admission? (2) Absence of suicidal behavior (attempts, gestures, or threats within two
weeks before admission)? (This item is checked if patient has not shown recent suicidal
behavior) (3) Schizophrenic or manic diagnosis? (4) Male gender? (5) Currently married
or living together?
McNiel & Binder, supra note 31, at 581.
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less were called "low risk."' If "fear-inducing behavior" (i.e., "attacks on
objects, threats to attack persons, or verbal attacks on persons") is included
along with actual physical assault as "violence," 57% of the "high risk" group
were violent early in their hospitalization, compared with 29% of the "low
risk" group (if one restricts the criterion to actual physical assault, the figures
become 32% and 18%, respectively).'
Actuarial research on the prediction of violence in the community is well
illustrated bythe research program of Klassen and O'Connor." For example,
Klassen and O'Connor found that, among males released from a mental
hospital, a diagnosis of substance abuse, prior arrests for violent crime, and
age (young) were significantly associated with arrests for violent crime after
release into the community. 6
Three actuarial tools, in particular, have been studied in the past several
years.37 One comprehensive research program is continuing to validate the
Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG), 5 an actuarial device that incorpo-
rates the Hare Psychopathy Checklist - Revised as one of its predictor vari-
ables. 9 In one study, a sample of 618 men who were either treated or admin-
istered a pre-trial assessment at a maximum security forensic hospital in Can-
33. Id. at 582.
34. Id. at 583.
35. Deidre Klassen & William A. O'Connor, A Prospective Study of Predictors of
Violence in Adult Male MentalHealth Admissions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 143 (1988).
36. Id. at 151 tbl.1.
37. See generally STm EN BLUMEDIHAL& TONY LAVENDER, VIOlENCE AND MENTAL
DisoRDER: ACRmTcALAIDTOTEASSESSMENTANDMANAGEiENToFRIsK (2000) (reviewing
literature on violence and mental disorder).
38. See QUINSEY ET AL, supra note 28, at 141-69 (assessing Violence Risk Appraisal
Guide (VRAG)); see also Grant T. Harris & Mamie E. Rice, RiskAppraisal and Management
of Violent Behavior, 48 PSYChiATRIC SERICES 1168, 1168 (1997) (reviewing past decade of
research, including use of VRAG); Mamie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, Cross-Validation and
Extension of the Violence RiskAppraisal Guide for Child Molesters and Rapists, 21 LAw &
HUM. BEaAv. 231,232 (1997) (using VRAG in study); Mamie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, The
Treatment of MentallyDisordered Offenders, 3 PSYCHOL, PUB. POL'Y, & L. 126,133-34 (1997)
(evaluating VRAG as research tool); Marnie E. Rice, Violent Offender Research and Implica-
tions for the Criminal Justice System, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 414, 414 (1997) (discussing
research regarding predictions of violent reoffending).
39. A well-established instrument that has been associated with violence in many studies
is the Hare Psychopathy Checklist - Revised (the "Hare PCL-R"). Hare has argued that
"psychopathy is the single most important clinical construct in the criminal justice system, with
particularly strong implications for the assessment of risk for recidivism and violence." Robert
D. Hare, The Hare PCL-R. Some Issues Concerninglts Use andMisuse, 3 LEGAL& CpMaINo-
LOGICAL PSYCHOL 99,99(1998). For a review of the extensive research on psychopathy and
violence, see Robert D. Hare, Psychopathy: A Clinical Construct Whose Time Has Come, 23
CRM. JUST. & BMAV. 25 (1996).
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ada served as subjects.4" All were charged with a serious criminal offense.41
A wide variety of predictive variables were coded from institutional files.42
The criterion variable was any new criminal charge for a violent offense or
return to the institution for an act that would otherwise have resulted in such
a charge.4' The average time at risk after release was almost seven years. 4'
Twelve variables were identified for inclusion in the final statistical prediction
instrument.4" If the scores on this instrument were dichotomized into "high"
and "low" risk groups, the results indicated that 55% of the "high scoring"
subjects committed violent recidivism, compared with 19% of the "low
scoring" group.
46
Douglas and Webster' reviewed research on a second, recently devel-
oped actuarial instrument to assess risk of violence, the "HCR-20," which
consists oftwenty ratings addressing Historical, Clinical, or Risk management
variables."s They also reported data from a retrospective study with prisoners,
40. CHRISTOPHERD. WEBSTERET AL, THE VIOLENCE PREDICIION SCHEME: AssESsING
DANGERousNEss NBHIGHRiSKMEN29 (1994).
41. Id. at 30.
42. Id. at 31.
43. Id. at 30.
44. Id.
45. The variables were: (1) score on the Psychopathy Checklist, (2) separation from
parents before age 16, (3) victim injury in index offence, (4) DSM-lIM schizophrenia, (5) never
married, (6) elementary school maladjustment, (7) female victim in index offence, (8) failure
on prior conditional release, (9) nonviolent offence history, (10) age at index offence,
(11) alcohol abuse history, and (12) DSM-lIM personality disorder. For all variables except
numbers three, four, seven, and ten, the nature of the relationship to subsequent violence was
positive. That is to say, subjects who injured a victim in the index offense, who were diagnosed
as schizophrenic, who chose a female victim for the index offense, or who were older, were
significantly less likely to be violent recidivists than other subjects. WEBSTER ET AL, supra
note 40, at 31 tbl.4.1.
46. See id. at 33 (computing estimates of dangerousness).
47. See Kevin S. Douglas & Christopher D. Webster, The HCR-20 Violence RiskAssess-
ment Scheme: Concurrent Validity in a Sample ofIncarcerated Offenders, 26 CRM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 3 (1999) (assessing concurrent validity of HCR-20); see also Kevin S. Douglas et al.,
Assessing Riskfor Violence Among Psychia&ic Patients: The HCR-20 Violence RiskAssess-
ment Scheme and the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version, 67 J. CONSULTING & CLNI-
CAL PSYCHOL. 917 (1999); Martin Grann et al., Actuarial Assessment ofRiskfor Violence:
Predictive Validity of the VRAG and the Historical Part of the HCR-20, 27 CILM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 97 (2000). Information on the HCR-20 is available from the Mental Health, Law and
Policy Institute on the web at http'/www.lawpsych.org.
48. CHRISTOPHERD.WEBSTERETAL,HCR-20: ASSESSiNGRiSKFORVIOlENcE (version
2) (1997). The 10 Historical items are: (111) previous violence, (142) young age at first violent
incident, (H3) relationship instability, (H4) employment problems, (H5) substance use problems,
(H6) major mental illness, M7) psychopathy, (H8) early maladjustment, (H9) personality dis-
order, and (H10) prior supervision failure. Id. at 27-47. The five Clinical items are: (Cl) lack
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finding that "scores above the median on the HCR-20 increased the odds of
the presence of various measures of past violence and antisocial behavior by
an average of four times.""9
The most recent development in this area is the publication of the work
of the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study."0 Here, the researchers
developed what they called an "Iterative Classification Tree," or ICT.5' They
sought to increase the utility of this actuarial method for real-world clinical
decision making by applying the method to a set of violence risk factors
commonly available in clinical records or capable of being routinely assessed
in clinical practice.52 Results showed that the ICT partitioned three-quarters
of a sample of psychiatric patients into one of two categories with regard to
their risk of violence to others during the first twenty weeks after discharge
(a period during which 18.7% of all patients committed at least one violent
of insight, (C2) negative attitudes, (C3) active symptoms of major mental illness, (C4) im-
pulsivity, and (C5) unresponsive to treatment Id. at 49-59. The five Risk Management items
are: (R1) plans lack feasibility, (R2) exposure to destabilizers, (R3) lack of personal support,
(R4) non-compliance with remediation attempts, and (R5) stress. Id. at 61-71.
49. Douglas & Webster, supra note 47, at 3.
50. See John Monahan et al., Developing a Clinically UsefulActuarial Tool for Assess-
ing Violence Risk, 176 BRr. J. PSYCHIATRY 312, 312 (2000) (assessing usefulness of ICT
method); Eric Silver et al, Assessing Violence Risk Among Discharged Psychiatric Patients:
Toward an EcologicalApproach, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 237,237 (1999) (using data "to
examine the effect of the neighborhood context on risk of violence"); Henry I. Steadman et al.,
A Classification Tree Approach to the Development of Actuarial Violence Risk Assessment
Tools, 24 LAW & HUM BE AV. 83, 83 (2000) (arguing that actuarial tools do not accurately
reflect contingent nature of clinical assessment process).
51. See Steadman et al, supra note 50, at 92 (labeling resulting classification tree model).
Gardner, Lidz, Mulvey, and Shaw made an important methodological contribution to the use of
actuarial information in predicting violence by civil patients in the community - a contribution
on which the MacArthur study built See Wlliam Gardner et al., A Comparison ofActuarial
Methods for Identifying Repetitively Violent Patients with Mental Illness, 20 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 35, 35 (1996) (reporting on progress in developing practical methods for actuarial
prediction of violence). They contrasted the usual "regression equation" model -in which points
for various risk factors are summed to yield a prediction score, to which cut-offs are applied -
with newer "regression tree" methods. A regression tree is "a structured sequence of yes/no
questions that lead to the classification of a case." Id. at 36. The four "yes" or "no" questions
contained in the authors' regression tree were: "Is BSI Hostility greater than 2?" [i.e., is the
patient's score on the Hostility subscale of the Brief Symptom Inventory greater than 2?]; "Is age
less than 187;" "Is the patient a heavy drug user?;" and "Are there more than 3 prior violent acts?"
Id. at 40 fig.2. This regression tree identified a small group of patients (3% of the patient
population) who committed violent acts at the high rate of 2.75 incidents per month. Id. at 41-
42; see also Wiliam Gardner et al., Clinical VersusActuarialPredictions of Violence in Patients
with Mental Illnesses, 64 3. CONSULTNG & CLNICAL PSYCHOL. 602, 602 (1996) (comparing
accuracy of each method).
52. See Steadman et al., supra note 50, at 85 (describing study sample).
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act). 3 One category consisted of groups whose rates of violence were no
more than half the baserate of the total patient sample (i.e., equal to or less
than 9% violent). 4 The other category consisted of groups whose rates of
violence were at least twice the baserate ofthe total patient sample (i.e., equal
to or greater than 37% violent).55 The prevalence of violence within individ-
ual risk groups varied from 3% to 53%, considerably more accurate than
clinical predictioni
6
As the field has moved in a more actuarial direction, professional consen-
sus has shifted from the question of "how accurate are clinicians in general at
predicting violence" to "how valid are specific risk factors, or specific combi-
nations of risk factors, for assessing violence risk?157 Violence risk assess-
ment is likely to continue to move in a more actuarial direction. Increased
attention is likely to be given to how estimates of risk are best communicated
to those who have to make decisions based on them.58
l. Admissibility as Scientific Evidence
In this Part, I address the admissibility at trial of expert psychological
testimony on violence risk assessment under the test for scientific evidence
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow




57. In a recent major meta-analysis of actuarial risk factors for crime and violence among
mentally disordered offenders, Bonta, Law, and Hanson found those risk factors to be remark-
ably similar to well-known risk factors among the general offender population:
Criminal history, antisocial personality, substance abuse, and family dysfunction
are important for mentally disordered offenders as they are for general offenders.
In fact, the results support the theoretical perspective that the major correlates of
crime are the same, regardless of race, gender, class, and the presence or absence
of mental illness. Clinical or psychopathological variables were either unrelated to
recidivism or negatively related.
See James Bonta et al., The Prediction of Criminal and Violent Recidivism Among Mentally
Disordered Offen ders: AMeta-Ana ysis, 123 PSYCHOL. BUT 123,139 (1998) (concluding that
major predictors for violent recidivism were same for mentally disordered offenders as for
nondisordered offenders).
58. See John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman, Violent Stoms and Violent People: How
Meteorology Can Inform Risk Communication in Mental Health Law, 51 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
931,931-38 (1996) (exploring analogy between two forms of risk assessment "forecasts"); Paul
Slovic etal., Violence RiskAssessment and Risk Communication: The Effects of UsingActual
Cases, ProvidingInstruction, and EmployingProbabilify Versus Frequency Formats, 24 LAW
& HUM. BEHIAV. 271, 271 (2000) (describing studies designed to inform policy makers and
practitioners).
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 9 Many American state courts - where the vast major-
ity of psychological and psychiatric testimony is offered - have adopted the
Dauberttest." For illustrative purposes, I will rely on one representative state
case, E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson,' to framethe discussion. 2
In Robinson, the Supreme Court of Texas specified six factors 'that a
trial court may consider in making the threshold determination of admissibil-
ity.''i 3 Those factors include, but are not limited to:
(1) the extent to which the theory has been or can be tested;
(2) the extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective inter-
pretation of the expert;
(3) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and/or pub-
lication;
(4) the technique's potential rate of error;
(5) whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally
accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; and
(6) the non-judicial uses which have been made of the theory or
technique. 4
My evaluation of the points at issue will follow these six Robinson
factors. I note at the outset that the leading American legal treatise in this
field, Modem Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony,
states:
To date, no court has evaluated the admissibility of expert testimony
regarding future violence under the Court's recent Daubert decision. In
fightoftheveryfewcasesprecedingDaubertwhichengagedinanyeviden-
tiary analysis whatsoever, this state of affairs is unlikely to change soon.'
The year after Faignman and others wrote, however, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, in Nenno v. State,' evaluated the admissibility of expert
clinical testimony on the prediction of futur6 violence in the context of a death
59. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
60. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-92 (1993) (listing
several factors trial judge may consider when deciding whether to admit expert testimony).
61. 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
62. See E. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549,550 (Tex. 1995)
(affirming trial court's conclusion that expert's testimony was not based on reliable foundation).
63. Id. at 557 (citation omitted).
64. Id. at 557 n.2 ("'That an expert testifies based on research he has conducted independ-
ent of the litigation provides important, objective proof that the research comports with the
dictates of good science.'" (quoting Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311,1317
(9th Cir. 1995) (citing HuBER, GAuLEo's REvEN E 206-09 (1991)))).
65. FAIGEmANETAL,sUpra note 6, § 7-1.5, at 298.
66. 970 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
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penalty case.67 The court of criminal appeals stated that "[w]hen addressing
fields of study aside from the hard sciences, such as the social sciences or
fields that are based primarily upon experience and training as opposed to the
scientific method, [the law's] requirement of reliability applies but with less
rigor than to the hard sciences. ' s The court concluded that a defect in the
scientific reliability of research on violence prediction "affects the weight of
the evidence rather than its admissibility. We find the reliability of [the
expert's] testimony to be sufficiently established .... 1,6"
A. The Extent to Which the Theory Has Been Tested
As described in Part l at least seven empirical studies conducted since
the 1970s have tested the proposition that psychologists and psychiatrists have
greater-than-chance accuracy at predicting violent behavior to others in the
open community. 0 Many additional studies have tested the proposition that
psychologists and psychiatrists have greater-than-chance accuracy at predict-
ing violence to others within closed institutions.7'
B. Reliance on the Subjective Interpretation of the Expert
The American Bar Association recently published the National Bench-
bookonPsychiatricandPsychologicalEvidence and Testimony (Benchbook).1 2
The Benchbook is directed to state and federal judges and is explicitly "de-
signed to aid decision-making ... regarding admissibility of evidence .... 71
Although it acknowledges that subjective clinical interpretations often play a
role in psychiatric predictions of dangerousness, the Benchbook concludes:
Despite recent commentary indicating that clinicians are better at address-
ing possi'le riskfactors andprobabilitiesthanprovidingdefinitivepreic-
tions of dangerousness, courts have remained reluctant to totally exclude
such [clinical] evidence, in part, perhaps, because courts are ultimately
responsible for making these decisions and though the information may
remain opento challenge, itisthebestinformationavailable. The alterna-
67. Nenno v. State, 970 S.W,2d 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
68. See id. at 561 (listing appropriate questions for areas outside of hard sciences).
69. Id. at 562.
70. STEADMAN & CocozzA, supra note 10; Cocozza & Steadman, supra note 10; Kozol
t al., supra note 10; Lidz et al., supra note 15; Sepjak et al., supra note 11; Steadman, supra
note 10.
71. See McNiel et al., The Relationship Between Confidence andAccuracy, supra note
31, at 655 (concluding that clinician's confidence in evaluation affects validity of assessment).
72. AMERICANBARASSOCIKIION,NATiONALBENCHBooKoNPsYCIATRICANDPSYcHo-
LOGICAL EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY (1998) [hereinafter BENCEBOOK].
73. Id. at iii.
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tive is to deprive fact finders, judges and jurors of the guidance and under-
standing that psychiatrists and psychologists can provide .... 74
C. Subject to Peer Review and Publication
All seven empirical tests of the ability of psychologists and psychiatrists
to clinically assess risk of violence in the community have been published.
Five of the seven tests have been published in peer-reviewed scientific jour-
nals, rather than in books or student-edited law reviews; this includes the most
methodologically sophisticated study,7" which was published in JAMA - the
Journal of the American Medical Association - among the most prestigious
and selective scientific journals in the world.
In addition to the initial peer review to which these studies were sub-
jected in the process of being approved for publication, all ofthe studies have
been subjected to extensive critique in literature reviews published by many
other researchers.76 The most recent international scientific review of vio-
lence risk assessment, published in England in March, 2000, concludes:
Risk assessment has steadily increased in importance since [the 1960s],
and this has been accompaniedbymethodological improvements, particu-
larly in the last decade.... It is relatively recently that the science of risk
assessment has developed sufficiently to claim a level of accuracy which
makes it useful.7
74. Id. at49.
75. Lidz et al., supra note 15.
76. See generally FAIGMAN ET AL, supra note 6 (discussing clinical and actuarial pre-
dictions within context of modem scientific evidence); GARY B. MELTONET AL, PtYCHOI.Loi-
CAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: AHANDBOOKFORPIENTALHEALTHPROFESSIONAIS &
LAWYERs (2d ed. 1997) (providing guidelines for practitioners); MONAHAN, supra note 9
(describing clinical prediction); Thomas R. Litwack, Assessments of Dangerousness: Legal,
Research, and ClinicalDevelopments, 21 ADM[N. & POL'Y iN MENTAL HEALTH 361 (1994)
(exploring courts' treatments of assessments of dangerousness); Thomas R. Litwack & Louise
B. Schlesinger, Dangerousness Risk Assessments: Research, Legal, and Clinical Consider-
ations, in THE HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY (Allen K. Hess & Irving B. Weiner eds.,
2d ed. 1999) (discussing assessments of dangerousness in clinical and legal arenas); Joseph T.
McCann, RiskAssessment and the Prediction of ViolentBehavior, FED. LAW., Oct. 1997, at 18
(summarizing current status of clinical risk assessment and prediction of violent behavior); John
Monahan, Major Mental Disorders and Violence to Others, in HANDBOOK OF ANTISOCIAL
BEHAVIOR (David M. Stoff et al. eds., 1997) (providing general discussion of mental illness and
dangerousness to others); Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Ac-
curate About Accuracy, 62 3. CONsULTINO & CLNICAL PSYCHOL. 783 (1994) (reanalyzing
studies of violence prediction); Douglas Mossman, Further Comments on Portraying the
Accuracy of Violence Predictions, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 587 (1994) (suggesting use of
receiver operating characteristics).
77. BLUMENTHAL & LAVENDER, supra note 37, at 1-2,14.
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D. Potential Rate ofError
No one questions that the state of the science is such that the prediction
of violence, like the prediction of the weather,78 is subject to a consider-
able margin of error. But in acknowledging this error rate, the American Bar
Association's Benchbook nonetheless states:
While the frustration with psychiatry and psychology from a legal stand-
point centers on the certainty or lack thereof with which mental health
experts speak to the ultimate issues in a case (for example, dangerous-
ness... ), this frustration should not lead courts to reject all such input, but
rather should encourage courts to recognize the properrole andlimitations
of expert evidence and testimony in the courtroom.79
Commenting on the inevitable margin of error in predicting human
behavior, Faigman and others concluded as did the Benchbook. "Although
courts appear to uniformly accept the inherent difficulty in predicting future
behavior, they have, nonetheless, liberally permitted expert testimony on this
issue.
80
Finally, Shuman, in Psychiatric and Psychological Evidence, stated:
Althoughjudges have expressed skepticism about thevalidity ofpsychiat-
ricandpsychologicalpredictionsoffutureviolenceandhave, occasionally,
imposed limitations on this sort of testimony, there has been an overall
judicial reluctance to exclude this evidence.... [J]udges have been un-
willing to deprive lay decision makers of whatever guidance psychiatrists
and psychologists may provide in this area, and have relegated challenges
to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence.8 '
E. General Acceptance in the Relevant Scientific Community
The American Bar Association's Benchbook states that there is "a grow-
ing consensus that the ability of clinicians to identify risk factors associated
with future violence is improving."' For example, the best-known recent
study ofthe validity of clinical predictions of violence concludes: '"hat this
study [shows] is that clinical judgment has been undervalued in previous
research. Not only did the clinicians pick out a statistically more violent
78. Monahan& Steadman, supra note 58, at 931-38.
79. BENCHBOOK, supra note 72, at 47-48.
80. FAIGMANET AL, supra note 6, at 299.
81. DANIELW.SHUMANPSYc CANDPsYcHOLOGiCALEDENcE7-13 (2d ed. 1997
& Supp. 1999).
82. BENCHBOOK, supra note 72, at22 (citation omitted).
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group, but the violence that the predicted group committed was more serious
than the acts of the comparison group."'
Likewise, a recent critical analysis of existing risk assessment research
reaches this measuredjudgment: "This article's reevaluation of representative
data from the past 2 decades suggests that clinicians are able to distinguish
violent from nonviolent patients with a modest, better-than-chance level of
accuracy."
8 4
F. Non-Judicial Uses of the Theory or Technique
A concern with violence by people with mental disorder, and with how
the risk of that violence might clinically be assessed, is ubiquitous in all
societies and occurs throughout written history. References can be found in
ancient Greek and Roman writing and in the texts of many non-Western
cultures as well. 5 In modem times and in the Unites States, violence risk
assessment not only penneates the legal system, but also is a significant
component of general clinical practice in the mental health fields. As has
been recently stated in Emergencies in Mental Health Practice, "Clinical
assessment of violence potential and management of aggressive behavior are




In many cases that preceded Daubert, the United States Supreme Court
endorsed the admissibility of expert clinical testimony on the prediction of
violence. For example, the Court in Barefoot v. Estelle,' stated:
The suggestion that no psychiatrist's testimony may be presented with
respect to a defendant's future dangerousness is somewhat like asking us
to disinvent the wheel. In the first place, it is contraryto our cases. If the
likelihood of a defendant committing further crimes is a constitutionally
acceptable criterion for imposing the death penalty, which it is, Jurek v.
83. Lidz ct al., supra note 15, at 1010.
84. Mossman, supra note 76, at 790.
85. See John Monahan, Mental Disorder and Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evi-
dence, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511, 511 (1992) (discussing historical perceptions ofconnection
between mental disorder and violence).
86. Dale E. MoNiel, Empftically Based Clinical Evaluation and Management of the
Potentially ViolentPatien4inEMERaNsCEsI ENTALHEALTHPRACcE: EVALUATIONAND
MANAGEMENT 95 (Phillip M. Kieespies ed., 1998).
87. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
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Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), and if it is not impossible for even a lay
person sensibly to arrive at that conclusion, it makes little sense, if any, to
submit that psychiatrists, out of the entire universe of persons who might
have an opinion on the issue, would know so little about the subject that
they should not be permitted to testify... In the second place, the rules
of evidence generally extant at the federal and state levels anticipate that
relevant, unprivileged evidence should be admitted and its weight left to
the factfinder, who would have the benefit of cross examination and
contrary evidence by the opposing party 8U
The Court concluded that, although it is not easy to predict future behavior,
"'[t]he fact that such a determination is difficult... does not mean that it
cannot be made."'89
Similarly, in Schall v. Martin,9° the Court upheld the pretrial detention
of a juvenile if there was a "serious risk" that the released juvenile would
commit a crime before his or her next court appearance. 91 The Court rejected
the argument that violence predictions could not be made reliably. Instead,
the Court asserted that "from a legal point of view there is nothing inherently
unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct."'
The Court again endorsed psychiatric and psychological predictions in
United States v. Salerno.93 In Salerno, the Supreme Court upheld the Bail
Reform Act of 1984.9' The Bail Reform Act 95 permitted pretrial detention of
persons who presented a danger to others.' In approving the Act, the Court
thus sanctioned another context in which psychiatric and psychological pre-
dictions of violence may be offered as evidence.
Although the three cases above illustrate the Supreme Court's pre-
Daubert endorsement of psychiatric and psychological predictions, the Court
has not yet approved of clinical violence risk assessment in the post-Daubert
era. Despite the lack of case law, there has been much post-Daubert commen-
tary on the issue in legal and scientific literatures. Virtually all of this corn-
88. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-98 (1983) (permitting psychiatric testi-
mony). Although the Court discussed testimony from a psychiatrist its reasoning equally
applies to testimony from a psychologist.
89. See id. at 897 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,274-75 (1976)).
90. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
91. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 281 (1984) (concluding that New York statute
did not violate Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
92. See id. at 278 (upholding detention based on finding of "serious risk").
93. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
94. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,752 (1987) (concluding that Act was not
invalid under Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment).
95. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3151 (1998).
96. The Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141-3151 (1998).
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mentary suggests that testimony by a qualified expert regarding a properly
conducted clinical violence risk assessment will remain admissible evidenceY
For example, the American Bar Association's Benchbook concludes:
[E]ven given the underlying uncertainties and discrepancies within the
psychiatric and psychological communities, psychiatrists and psychol-
ogists-throughtheireducationand experiences-acquire specialinforma-
ion and skills that are beyond that of the lay community to better under-
stand andinterprethumanbehavior (normal andabnormal). Thus, inmany
instances the knowledge of psychiatrists and psychologists can assist
factfindersinunderstandingandinterpretinghumanbehaviorwithinalegal
context.98
Likewise, the leading professional work in this area, Psychological Eval-
uations for the Courts, states:
Some critics might argue that much ofthe empirical and clinical analysis
[of violence prediction] relies on "face valid" factors that lay decision-
makers, applying common sense, could use to reach the same judgments.
We disagree. Although the implications of some factors are evident on
their face..., laypersons will notbe as familiar with orbe able to interpret
as well other types of factors.... Such informed testimony can help
prevent the courts from reaching inappropriate conclusions based on
stereotypical views of "psychopaths" or "schizophrenics" and may thus
facilitate more disciplined and humane dispositionsbyjudges andjuries.9 9
Finally and persuasively, the second edition oftheHandbook ofForensic
Psychology arrives at the following conclusion regarding the admissibility of
psychological and psychiatric experts on violence risk assessments in Amer-
ican courts:
[I]tcouldbe arguedthat mental healthprofessionals should notbe allowed
to testify as experts [on violence prediction] under the Daubert standard.
However, (a) historically, the Supreme Court has been receptive to profes-
sional assessments of dangerousness; (b) in almost any case in which such
assessments are made they will be based, at least in part, on validated risk
factors (e.g., a history of violence); (c) mental health professionals could
97. Cf. FAIGMANET AL., supra note 6, at 299-300. Faigman wrote:
[C]ourts have yet to explain fully the constitutional basis for permitting admittedly
unreliable evidence when a person's liberty or life is at risk. Possibly, as judges
become more comfortable with the complexity and subtlety of the scientific method
as the Daubert era progresses, their constitutional analysis in this area will also
grow more complex and subtle.
Id. at 299-300.
98. BENCHBOOK, supra note 72, at 47.
99. MELTONET AL, supra note 76, at 292-93.
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well make the point that they cannot validate their expertise in many
circumstances withoutreleasing dangerous individuals; (d) throughout our
society, mental health professionals are expected by the law to make
professional assessments of dangerousness when patients pose a serious
risk of harm to others; (e) the Supreme Court also stated m Daubert that,
still, "[w]idespread acceptance canbeanmiportantfactormnrulingparticu-
lar evidence admissible," and clincal assessments of dangerousness are
widely accepted by the clincal community and increasingly by the aca-
demic community, and (f) if nothing else, it is likely that mental health
professionalswillbebetter ablethanlaypersons to articulate, ighlight, and
analyze the factors that go into a dangerousness riskassessment. Given all
tls, itishlghlyunlikethattheDaubertdecisionwil affectthe admssi'bil-
ity of professional assessments of dangerousness in federal courts or in
states that follow the Daubert decision.'°
100. Litwaek& Schlesmgersupra note 76, at 192-93.
